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Abstract
A puzzling feature of many retail markets is the coexistence of large multiproduct
rms and smaller rms with narrow product ranges. This paper provides a possible
explanation for this puzzle, by studying how consumer search frictions inuence
the structure of retail markets. In our model single-product rms which supply
di¤erent products can merge to form a multiproduct rm. Consumers wish to
buy multiple products, and due to search frictions value the one-stop shopping
convenience associated with a multiproduct rm. We nd that when search frictions
are relatively large all rms are multiproduct in equilibrium. However when search
frictions are smaller the equilibrium market structure is asymmetric, with di¤erent
retail formats coexisting. This allows rms to better segment the market, and as
such typically leads to the weakest price competition. When search frictions are low
this asymmetric market structure is also the worst for consumers. Moreover due to
the endogeneity of market structure, a reduction in the search friction can increase
market prices and harm consumers.
Keywords: consumer search, multiproduct pricing, one-stop shopping, retail mar-
ket structure, conglomerate merger
JEL classication: D11, D43, D83, L13
1 Introduction
Many consumers place a high value on the convenience of one-stop shopping. They
are often time-constrained, and so welcome the opportunity to buy a large basket of
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products in one place. Indeed in one survey by the UK Competition Commission in 2000,
almost half the respondents said that the ability to buy everything in one location was
the main factor inuencing where they shopped.1 Consequently product assortment is
an important dimension along which retailers compete. Over time many retailers have
attempted to become one-stop shops through aggressive increases in the size of their
product assortments.2 Nevertheless, and somewhat puzzlingly, in most retail markets
large players like Wal-Mart or Amazon still coexist with many smaller retailers whose
product ranges are much narrower.
Surprisingly, there is little research investigating why di¤erent retail formats can coex-
ist despite consumers having a preference for one-stop shopping convenience. Our paper
provides a framework to investigate this issue. As we explain in more detail below, we
consider a model in which consumers nd it costly and time-consuming to visit a retailer
and learn about its prices and products. We consider incentives of rms selling di¤erent
products to merge and sell them in one place, thus reducing consumerssearch costs and
providing them with one-stop shopping convenience. Our merger framework is partly mo-
tivated by the fact that many well-known retailers are increasingly growing their product
ranges through mergers and acquisitions. For example Amazons takeover of Whole Foods
will facilitate its entry into the grocery sector, whilst its earlier acquisition of LoveFilm
was designed to create a one-stop service for video streaming, DVD rental, and books.
Along similar lines, the UK supermarket Sainsburys recently bought the non-food retailer
Argos, with the aim of eventually locating their products under the same roof. Mean-
while Starbucks acquired the La Boulange chain, closed its branches, but incorporated its
bakery products into its own outlets. A recurring theme in these (and many other) exam-
ples is that the merger brings di¤erent but related products into one location, creating a
one-stop shop for consumers. We therefore believe that our merger framework addresses
an important issue in its own right. Of course retailers can also grow their product ranges
organically, and so later in the paper we discuss how our main insights can also apply to
this kind of growth.
1See https://goo.gl/MBnTyn. To put this in perspective, only 18% stated that price was the main
factor. A more recent survey in the US conrms that many consumers no longer shop at traditional
grocery stores, with 77% of respondents having bought groceries from big box stores like Wal-Mart or
Target in 2013 (see https://goo.gl/Avui2B).
2For instance the Food Marketing Institute estimates that between 1975 and 2013, the number of
products in an average US supermarket increased from around 9,000 to almost 44,000, at least some of
which is due to new product categories. Messinger and Narasimhan (1997) provide empirical evidence
that time-saving convenience is the most important driver of this growth in store size, whilst Seo (2015)
estimates that the value of one-stop shopping convenience from grocery stores being able to sell liquor is
about 8% of an average households liquor expenditure.
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In more detail, we consider a market in which there are two products (or product
categories) and each of them is initially sold by two di¤erentiated single-product rms.
Each pair of single-product rms which supply di¤erent products choose whether to merge
and form a multiproduct rm. This generates one of three possible market structures:
either four single-product rms, or two multiproduct rms, or an asymmetric market with
one multiproduct rm and two single-product rms. Consumers wish to buy one unit of
each of the two products, but each consumer is initially uncertain about her personal
valuation for a particular product as well as its price, and therefore must search a retailer
in order to learn this information. We capture one-stop shopping convenience by assuming
that it costs the same amount to search a single-product or a multiproduct retailer. The
aim is then to understand how this search friction inuences the nal market structure.3
As a preliminary step, the paper rst derives equilibrium prices and optimal consumer
search rules in each of the three possible market structures. As an example consider the
case of an asymmetric market, where one multiproduct rm competes with two single-
product retailers. We show that here the multiproduct retailer charges lower prices, and
yet earns higher prot because it is searched rst by consumers and so ends up making
many more sales. Intuitively consumers start by searching the large (generalist) retailer
due to its one-stop shopping convenience. Many consumers stay there and purchase, due
to the cost of searching again. As a result, a small (specialist) retailer is only searched by
consumers who could not nd a suitable product at the generalist, which it then exploits
by charging relatively high prices. This prediction does not rely on di¤erences in produc-
tion costs, and is consistent with anecdotal evidence that larger rms are cheaper. This
link between store size and pricing has also been conrmed empirically by, for example,
Asplund and Friberg (2002) for Sweden and by Kaufman et al. (1997) for the US.
In our framework a merger inuences retailersprots in two distinct ways. Firstly
there is a search e¤ect: when two single-product rms which supply di¤erent prod-
ucts merge, they provide one-stop shopping convenience and so are searched by more
consumers. This increases the merged entitys sales of each product relative to the pre-
merger situation. Secondly though, there is also a price competition e¤ect, because
as the market structure changes so do retailersoptimal prices. In particular we show
that the asymmetric market structure usually leads to the weakest price competition.
Intuitively the small retailers are able to identify and exploit nicheconsumers who do
3In our model consumers have both shopping frictions and imperfect information. This is a plausible
assumption in many retail markets, where prices and product varieties may vary over time. An alternative
modeling approach would be to have shopping frictions but perfect consumer information e.g. a framework
like in Armstrong and Vickers (2010). We anticipate that our main result would still hold in such a setting,
however the analysis (when there is at least one multiproduct rm) would not be simpler since the model
would then resemble one of competitive mixed bundling.
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not like the large retailers products. As a result the two types of rm attract di¤erent
types of clientele, and so are relatively well di¤erentiated. One implication of this is that
there is always at least one multiproduct rm in equilibrium, since the rst pair of rms
to merge benet both from a higher demand and softer competition. More interestingly,
we nd that the size of the search friction determines whether or not a second merger
occurs. In particular, if the second pair of rms merge, they too o¤er one-stop shopping
convenience and so win back some demand, but also reduce market segmentation and so
induce ercer competition. We show that for a large search friction the rst e¤ect is more
important and so a second merger occurs, however when the search friction is smaller the
second e¤ect dominates and the market ends up asymmetric. In the latter case, even the
remaining small rms can do better than in the initial fragmented market.
To illustrate some of our results, rst consider the merger between Amazon and Whole
Foods. As one commentator put it Adding groceries to its repertoire gets Amazon that
much closer to being a one-stop destination for everything you buy... [and] reinforces the
behavior by which customers search for things to buy on Amazon.com, rather than on a
search engine like Googlei.e. the merger is designed to make Amazon the place to start
shopping.4 Similarly, and in line with our search e¤ect whereby the merger should boost
demand for each product, the commentator continues ... every Whole Foods customer
[will have] to strongly consider signing up for Amazon Prime, which turns Amazon into
their de facto source not only for online retail but for instant video and other media.5
Second, our model suggests that rms may choose to remain small and target a particular
customer niche, thereby avoiding tough competition with already-established large rms.
In line with this, one writer noted that Most of the mom-and-pop bookstores today
have a little di¤erent clientele than Amazonand so are relatively immune from further
competition with it.6 Along the same lines, and consistent with our model, Igami (2011)
shows empirically that entry of very large supermarkets in Tokyo is bad for medium-sized
incumbents but good for small stores. One interpretation given in the paper is precisely
the idea that large supermarkets have a similar clientele to the former, but attract di¤erent
consumers compared to the latter.7 Third we also note that our model is consistent with,
but gives an alternative perspective on, the emergence of the so-called long tail of niche
providers on the internet. In particular our model suggests that when search costs are
4See https://goo.gl/25oF9e
5Quantitative evidence for our search e¤ect comes from Sen et al. (2013), who nd that when a
supermarket adds a gas station it enjoys 14% more shopping trips and 7.7%-9.3% more spending on
grocery items.
6See https://goo.gl/Ck3iTj
7Our model predicts that the e¤ect on small rms is ambiguous and should depend on market condi-
tions such as search frictions, and indeed evidence is mixed (see, e.g., Jia, 2008).
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small, an asymmetric market structure with many niche rms is a natural consequence
of rmsattempts to avoid erce competition.
Finally our paper derives some novel predictions about how changes in search frictions
a¤ect competition and consumer welfare. Early predictions that the internet would herald
a new era of frictionless commercehave proved to be unfounded. We show that this is
unsurprising once market structure is endogenized, since lower search frictions prompt a
reorganization of the supply-side in such a way that prices may actually rise and welfare
fall.
Related literature: Our search model with product di¤erentiation builds on Wolinsky
(1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999). These papers only study single-product search.
We extend them to the multiproduct case where consumers need and rms (may) supply
multiple products.
There is a growing literature on multiproduct consumer search. Lal and Matutes
(1994) show that multiproduct search can lead to loss-leader pricing when some products
are advertised. McAfee (1995) and Shelegia (2012) examine when and how multiprod-
uct rms correlate their prices across products when consumers are heterogeneously in-
formed.8 Zhou (2014) investigates how multiproduct search generates a joint search e¤ect,
which creates complementarity between physically independent products such that mul-
tiproduct rms have a higher incentive to reduce their prices than single-product rms.
Rhodes (2015) studies the relationship between the size of a retailers product range, its
pricing, and its advertising decision. He shows that a multiproduct retailers low adver-
tised prices can signal low prices on its unadvertised products. However all these papers
assume an exogenously given market structure where each rm sells the same range of
products. We depart from this literature by endogenizing market structure, and show
that an asymmetric market structure can emerge as an equilibrium outcome.
There is also research on multiproduct rms and endogenous market structure when
consumers have perfect information about rm o¤erings. Typically these papers consider
a duopoly model where each rm can choose which varieties of a product to supply. The
varieties are either horizontally di¤erentiated (e.g. Shaked and Sutton, 1990), or vertically
di¤erentiated (e.g. Champsaur and Rochet, 1989), or both (e.g. Gilbert and Matutes,
1993). However in these papers there is no notion of one-stop shopping convenience, and
moreover an asymmetric market with both large and small rms does not usually arise in
equilibrium. (See Manez and Waterson, 2001 for a survey of this literature.) There are
8See also Baughman and Burdett (2015) and Kaplan et al. (2016) for more recent work in this
direction. The former shows that assuming no consumer recall can greatly simplify the analysis of
multiproduct search with price dispersion. The latter o¤ers a search model with high and low valuation
consumers which can explain relative price dispersion across retailers.
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also papers on multiproduct competition which introduce shopping frictions whilst main-
taining the assumption of perfectly informed consumers. However they typically assume
an exogenous symmetric market where two rms supply the same range of products (e.g.
Lal and Matutes, 1989, Klemperer, 1992, and Armstrong and Vickers, 2010).9
Also related is the literature on agglomeration. Baumol and Ide (1956) argue that
larger retailers may attract more demand, because consumers are more willing to incur
the time and transportation costs necessary to visit them. Stahl (1982) shows that due
to a similar demand expansion e¤ect, single-product rms have an incentive to co-locate
(e.g. in a shopping mall) provided their products are not too substitutable. In a search
environment rms may locate near each other either to o¤er consumers a higher chance
of a good product match (Wolinsky, 1983), or as a way of guaranteeing consumers that
they will face low prices (Dudey, 1990 and Non, 2010). Moraga-González and Petrikait·e
(2013) show that when a subset of rms with di¤erentiated versions of a product merge
and sell all their products in a single shop, they become prominent and are searched
rst by consumers. However in all these papers consumers buy only one product, and so
any one-stop shopping convenience does not arise from consumersneed to buy multiple
products, even though this seems an important feature of many retail markets.
Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on conglomerate mergers (i.e., merg-
ers between rms supplying di¤erent non-competitive products).10 Since conglomerate
mergers do not eliminate competitors and may generate cost synergies, economists and
policymakers (especially in the US) often hold a benign view (see Church, 2008 for a
survey). However our model shows that conglomerate mergers have a potential anti-
competitive e¤ect and can harm consumers. In independent and concurrent work, Chen
and Rey (2015) examine conglomerate merger using a di¤erent framework. They nd that
conglomerate merger can also soften price competition, but that it benets consumers (at
least when bundling is infeasible). In addition, due to their modelling assumptions a sec-
ond conglomerate merger is never protable because it leads to Bertrand competition.11
9See also Johnson (2017) for a multiproduct competition model where the market friction is that
consumers are boundedly rational and make unplanned purchases. Section 3 of his paper considers an
asymmetric market where one rm is exogenously able to carry more products than another.
10There are two types of conglomerate merger. One involves rms producing totally unrelated products
(e.g. computers and tissues). The other involves rms producing complementary products, or products
which belong to a range of products that are generally purchased by the same set of consumers. (See for
example the EU guidelines on non-horizontal mergers.) The merger in our model is of the second type.
11Nalebu¤ (2000) and Thanassoulis (2011) come to a similar conclusion using di¤erent models where
rms can use bundling. They argue that if all single-product rms merge and form multiproduct rms,
the resulting bundle-against-bundle competition is so erce that all rms are harmed. Hence they argue
that an an asymmetric market will usually arise in equilibrium, though for di¤erent reasons compared to
both us and Chen and Rey (2015).
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the main model, Sec-
tion 3 characterizes the pricing equilibrium in various market structures, and Section 4
derives the equilibrium market structure. Section 5 discusses the robustness of our main
results. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of some further extensions and managerial
implications. All omitted proofs are available in the appendix.
2 The Model
There are a large number of consumers in the market with measure normalized to one.
Each consumer is interested in buying two di¤erent products 1 and 2. Initially there
are four single-product rms in the market: two of them, denoted by 1A and 1B, sell
product 1, and the other two, denoted by 2A and 2B, sell product 2. The marginal cost
of supplying each product is normalized to zero.
Each product is horizontally di¤erentiated across its two sellers. For example, the
sellers supply two di¤erent brands of the product with di¤erent styles. If a consumer
buys product ik, i = 1; 2 and k = A;B, she obtains utility vi + uik. Here vi is the basic
valuation for product i and is the same for all consumers, and uik is a consumer specic
match utility of product ik and is a random draw from the distribution Gi(u) with support
[ui; ui] and density gi(u). The realization of uik is i.i.d. across consumers, which reects
for example consumers idiosyncratic tastes, and is also i.i.d. across k, which implies
no systematic quality di¤erences across the two variants of each product. This random
utility approach for product di¤erentiation is developed in Perlo¤ and Salop (1985).12
For simplicity, we also suppose the two products are symmetric so that v1 = v2 = v
and G1 = G2 = G, and their match utilities are independent of each other. Consumers
have unit demand for each product, i.e. they will only buy a unit of one version of each
product. If a consumer buys two products with match utilities u1 and u2 respectively and
makes a total payment P , she obtains a surplus 2v + u1 + u2   P .
As we describe in more detail below, consumers would benet from the one-stop
shopping convenience from visiting a multiproduct rm which supplies both products. We
consider a two-stage game. At the rst stage, each pair of rms (1k,2k), k = A;B, which
supply di¤erent products, has the opportunity to merge and form a multiproduct rm.13
12Product di¤erentiation could alternatively be modeled using a spatial model, for example a Hotelling
line. However in spatial models match utilities are correlated across rms, which makes search analysis
less tractable. This is why the search literature with di¤erentiated products (e.g. Wolinsky, 1986, and
Anderson and Renault, 1999) uses the random utility framework with independent match utilities.
13Equivalently one rm has the opportunity to acquire the other. We assume that horizontal merger
between two rms selling the same product is not permitted (or is too costly), for instance due to antitrust
policy.
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Their merger decisions can be simultaneous (in which case we focus on pure-strategy
equilibria) or sequential. We assume that merger is costless and does not a¤ect consumer
preferences for each product or the marginal cost of supplying each product.14 At the
second stage, after observing the market structure rms simultaneously choose their prices
and consumers search and make their purchases. We assume that multiproduct rms
charge separate prices for each product and do not use more advanced pricing strategies
such as bundling,15 and consumers can multi-stop shop.
Consumers know whether a rm is single-product or multiproduct, but they initially
have imperfect information about the (actual) prices rms are charging and the match
utilities of all products. They only know the match utility distribution G(u) and hold
rational expectations about each rms pricing strategy. However they can learn a rms
prices and match utilities by incurring a search cost s > 0. To capture the idea of one-stop
shopping convenience, we will assume that visiting a multiproduct rm costs the same
as visiting a single-product one. The search process is sequential, and as is standard in
the literature consumers are assumed to have costless recall, i.e., they can to go back to a
previously visited rm to buy its products without paying any extra costs.16 This setup
is based on the classic single-product search framework developed in Wolinsky (1986) and
Anderson and Renault (1999).
Following Perlo¤ and Salop (1985) and Anderson and Renault (1999), we assume that
the basic valuation for each product v is su¢ ciently large so that all consumers buy both
products, i.e. each product market is fully covered. As we often see in the literature on
oligopolistic competition, this assumption simplies our analysis but does not a¤ect the
basic insights. Given full market coverage, v does not a¤ect our analysis and so we will
henceforth ignore it. Full market coverage also implies that consumers visit at least one
rm for each product. To have e¤ective competition in each possible market structure,
it must be the case that some consumers visit a second rm to compare products. To
ensure this happens we will assume that the search cost is not too high:
s <
Z u
u
(u  u)dG(u)  s : (1)
That is, even if a consumer is only looking for one product, if she nds the lowest possible
match utility at the rst rm, she has an incentive to search the second rm when they
14In practice mergers may be costly to propose, but could also generate economies of scope and therefore
long-term cost savings. We assume this away to highlight the e¤ect of one-stop shopping convenience.
15Indeed in most retail markets we do not observe store-wide bundling.
16The assumption of costless recall makes sense when, for example, the search cost is a product in-
spection cost, or it is a travel cost but consumers can call back a previously visited store to place an
order. Introducing a small return cost would signicantly complicate the analysis, but would not a¤ect
our main insights.
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both have the same (expected) price.
Both consumers and rms are assumed to be risk neutral. We use the concept of
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium to analyze the second stage of the game where the market
structure is given. Each rm sets its prices to maximize prots, given its expectation of
consumerssearch behavior and other rmspricing strategies. Consumers search opti-
mally to maximize their expected surplus, given their rational beliefs about rmspricing
strategies (which of course depend on how many rms are single-product or multiprod-
uct). In addition, even if a consumer searches a rm and observes o¤-equilibrium price(s),
she still holds the equilibrium belief about the unsampled rmsprices.17
Finally, we assume that the density function g(u) is strictly log-concave. (This implies
that 1 G(u) is strictly log-concave as well, or equivalentlyG has an increasing hazard rate
g(u)
1 G(u) .) This regularity condition is standard in the random utility oligopoly literature.
It is satised by, for example, the power distribution with G(u) = u and   1 (which
includes the uniform distribution), and many other commonly used distributions such
as normal, logistic and extreme value, as well as any truncated versions of them. (See
Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005 for a comprehensive list of log-concave distributions).
3 Pricing Under Di¤erent Market Structures
To examine the equilibrium market structure, we rst derive the pricing equilibrium in
each possible market structure. There are three market structures to consider: (i) if no
merger has occurred, a fragmented market with four independent single-product rms, (ii)
if only one pair of rms has merged, an asymmetric market with one multiproduct rm
and two single-product rms, and (iii) if both pairs of rms have merged, a symmetric
market with two multiproduct rms. We compare prices across market structures in the
end of this section.
3.1 A fragmented market with four single-product rms
With four single-product rms, a consumers search process is completely separable across
the two product markets. In each market we have a duopoly version of the sequential
search model in Anderson and Renault (1999). Consider the market for product i. Given
the two rms are symmetric, following the tradition in the search literature we look for a
symmetric equilibrium where both rms charge the same price p0 and consumers search
in a random order (i.e. half of the consumers visit rm iA rst and the other half visit
17Notice that in our model there are no economic shocks which are correlated across rms (such as
aggregate cost shocks), and so their pricing decisions are independent of each other.
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rm iB rst).18
To derive the equilibrium price for product i, suppose rm iA unilaterally deviates
and charges a price p00 while rm iB charges the equilibrium price. Notice that consumers
do not observe this price deviation before they search, so this does not a¤ect their search
order. Firm iAs demand has three sources: consumers who visit iA rst and buy imme-
diately, consumers who visit iA rst but continue to search iB and then return to buy at
iA, and consumers who visit iB rst and continue to search and buy at iA.
Consider a consumer who visits iA rst. Suppose she nds match utility uiA. Given
she holds the belief that rm iB charges the equilibrium price p0, she will stop searching
and buy immediately at iA if and only ifZ u
uiA p00+p0
[uiB   p0   (uiA   p00)]dG(uiB)  s ;
where the left-hand side is the incremental benet from sampling the second rm iB, since
if the consumer continues to search she will buy there if uiB   p0  uiA   p00 and will
otherwise return and buy from iA. Dene a as the solution toZ u
a
(u  a)dG(u) = s : (2)
(The left-hand side is decreasing in a, so this equation has a unique solution a 2 (u; u)
given s 2 (0; s), and a is decreasing in s.) Then the consumer will stop searching and
buy at iA immediately if uiA   p00  a  p0. (Here a  p0 is interpreted as the reservation
surplus above which a consumer will stop searching. If rms charge the same price, a is
the reservation match utility above which a consumer will stop searching.) This generates
the rst portion of rm iAs demand
1
2
[1 G(a  p0 + p00)] : (3)
If the consumer nds uiA   p00 < a   p0 at iA, she will continue to search iB but will
return and buy at rm iA if uiB   p0 < uiA   p00. This generates the second portion of
rm iAs demand
1
2
Pr[uiB   p0 < uiA   p00 < a  p0] =
1
2
Z a p0+p00
u
G(uiA   p00 + p0)dG(uiA) : (4)
Now consider a consumer who visits rm iB rst. Since rm iB is charging the equi-
librium price p0, and since the consumer holds an equilibrium belief about rm iAs price,
18We will discuss asymmetric equilibrium in a symmetric market (with either four single-product rms
or two multiproduct rms) and its implication for the equilibrium market structure in Section 5.
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she will come to visit iA if uiB < a. She will be surprised by iAs deviation price but will
still buy at iA if uiA p00 > uiB p0. This generates the third portion of rm iAs demand
1
2
Pr[uiB < a and uiB   p0 < uiA   p00] =
1
2
Z a
u
[1 G(uiB   p0 + p00)]dG(uiB) : (5)
Let Q0(p00) be rm iAs demand at price p
0
0 when iB is charging the equilibrium price.
It equals the sum of (3)(5). Notice that Q0(p0) = 12 due to rm symmetry and full market
coverage. Then one can check that the rst-order condition for p0 to be the equilibrium
price is19
1
p0
=  Q
0
0(p0)
Q0(p0)
= g(a)[1 G(a)] + 2
Z a
u
g(u)2du : (6)
In equilibrium each rm earns a prot 0 = 12p0.
To illustrate, consider the uniform distribution example with G(u) = u. Then we have
s 2 (0; 1
2
) from (1), and a = 1 p2s 2 (0; 1) from (2). Using (6) we derive
p0 =
1
2 p2s : (7)
It increases from 1
2
to 1 when s increases from 0 to 1
2
.
3.2 An asymmetric market
Now suppose 1A and 2A merge into a multiproduct rm A, while 1B and 2B remain
independent. Since the multiproduct rm A o¤ers one-stop shopping convenience, we
look for an equilibrium where all consumers visit it rst. In this case we sometimes say
rm A is the prominent rm. (We will discuss the possibility of other equilibria later
on.) Let pA be the multiproduct rms price for each of its products and pB be each
single-product rms price. Notice that we need to verify that it is indeed rational for
consumers to visit rm A rst after taking into account the price di¤erence between the
rms.
We rst notice that given the cost of visiting each single-product rm is separable, a
consumers search decision when she is at the multiproduct rm is also separable between
the two products. Formally, if the multiproduct rm A charges p0A for product i, a
consumer who nds match utilities (u1A; u2A) will continue to visit the single-product rm
iB if and only if the expected benet of doing so
R u
uiA p0A+pB
[uiB pB (uiA p0A)]dG(uiB) is
greater than the search cost s, regardless of ujA (j 6= i) and the multiproduct rms price
19If p[1 G(p)] is concave, the rst-order condition is also su¢ cient for dening the equilibrium price.
(See Appendix B in Anderson and Renault (1999) for other conditions which ensure the existence of
a symmetric pure-strategy pricing equilibrium.) Simple calculation shows that p0 decreases in a (so
increases in s) if 1 G is log-concave.
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for the other product. This is exactly the same as in the single-product search discussed
before. Therefore, a consumer will continue to search iB if and only if uiA  p0A < a  pB,
where a is dened in (2). The only di¤erence compared to the fragmented market is that
now consumers do not search randomly.20
Consider the market for product i. The demand for the multiproduct rms product,
if it charges p0A while its single-product rival iB sets the equilibrium price pB, is
[1 G(a  pB + p0A)] +
Z a pB+p0A
u
G(uiA   p0A + pB)dG(uiA) : (8)
Given all consumers visit rm A rst, the rst term is from the consumers who nd
uiA   p0A  a   pB and so buy immediately. This is similar to (3) in the previous case.
The second term is from the consumers who nd uiA   p0A < a   pB and so continue to
search rm iB but eventually return to rm A. This is similar to (4) in the previous case.
Demand for rm iBs product, if it charges price p0B while rm A sets its equilibrium
price pA, is Z a pB+pA
u
[1 G(uiA   pA + p0B)]dG(uiA) : (9)
Consumers will come to visit iB only if uiA  pA < a  pB given they hold the equilibrium
belief about rm iBs price, and will then buy from iB if uiB   p0B > uiA   pA. This is
similar to (5) in the previous case.
Dene   pB   pA and
Q()  1 
Z a 
u
[1 G(u+)]dG(u) : (10)
Notice that Q() is the equilibrium demand for rm As product i (i.e. (8) evaluated
at p0A = pA), and 1   Q() is the equilibrium demand for rm iB (i.e. (9) evaluated at
p0B = pB). Due to full market coverage, the equilibrium demands depend only on the
price di¤erence . Notice that Q(0) = 1
2
+ 1
2
[1   G(a)]2 > 1
2
. This conrms that when
the two rms charge the same price, rm A has a higher demand since it is prominent.
Since Q() increases in , rm As demand will be even higher if it charges a lower price
than iB.
Using the introduced notation, one can verify that the rst-order conditions for the
equilibrium prices (pA; pB) are21
pA =
Q()
Q0()
(11)
20In this sense the situation is similar to the non-random search studied in Armstrong, Vickers and
Zhou (2009). They do not assume full market coverage but focus on the uniform distribution case, while
we deal with a general distribution under the assumption of full market coverage.
21As in the case with four single-product rms, the rst-order conditions are also su¢ cient for dening
the equilibrium prices if p[1 G(p)] is concave.
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and
pB =
1 Q()
Q0()  g(a )[1 G(a)] : (12)
In equilibrium rm As per product prot is A = pAQ() and each single-product rms
prot is B = pB(1 Q()).
The analysis so far implicitly assumes that a    > u and that it is optimal for
consumers to visit rm A rst. The following result shows that this is indeed the case
under our log-concavity assumption. (All omitted proofs can be found in the appendix.)
Lemma 1 For any s 2 (0; s), the system of (11) and (12) has a solution  2 (0; a  u),
and lims!0 = lims!s = 0.
When > 0 (so pA < pB), the consumer search order is indeed optimal, since the mul-
tiproduct rm both provides one-stop shopping convenience and o¤ers lower prices. This
proves existence of the proposed equilibrium where all consumers visit the multiproduct
rm rst. The intuition for pA < pB is as follows. Consumers are more likely to buy
at the rst rm they visit because search is costly. Therefore only those who are rather
unsatised with the multiproduct rms products will choose to visit the single-product
rms. As a result, consumers who visit a single-product rm must on average prefer its
product over the multiproduct rms. In this sense we can interpret the multiproduct
rm as a generalist, and the single-product rms as specialists who only serve consumers
with strong preferences for their products. This implicit market segmentation gives single-
product rms some extra market power to charge a higher price. This prediction ts the
casual observation that large retailers tend to be cheaper than small ones. Notice that this
holds in our model even if the multiproduct rm does not have any cost advantage, and
so it complements the usual cost-based explanation. The price di¤erence  disappears in
the two limit cases because both the multiproduct rm and the two single-product rms
will act either as in the perfect information case, or as in the monopoly case respectively.
It is worth mentioning that although the multiproduct rm is cheaper than its smaller
competitors, it earns a higher prot from each product (i.e. A > B) due to its higher
demand. This can be seen from a revealed preference argument. Suppose for product i
the multiproduct rm A privately deviates and charges the same price pB as the single-
product rm iB. Then its prot from product i will drop to pBQ(0), but it is still greater
than B = pB(1 Q()) since Q(0) > 12 > 1 Q().
To illustrate the equilibrium prices, consider again the uniform distribution example.
Equations (11) and (12) simplify to
pA =
1
1 [1  a++
1
2
(a2  2)]; pB = 1  1
2
(a+) ;
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where a = 1 p2s. The system has a unique solution:
pA =
1
16
(3K   5a  5); pB = 1
16
(K   7a+ 9) ; (13)
where K  p17a2   30a+ 49. Both prices increase from 1
2
to 1 when s increases from 0
to 1
2
.
Discussion of other possible equilibria: In the asymmetric market, there is no equi-
librium where the multiproduct rms charge the same price as its single-product rivals.
Otherwise, all consumers would visit the multiproduct rm rst because of its one-stop
shopping convenience, and this search order would not support symmetric pricing across
rms. On the other hand, following a similar argument for pA < pB, in principle it is pos-
sible to have an alternative equilibrium in which consumers visit the two single-product
rms rst and they therefore charge lower prices than the multiproduct rm. However
for this to be an equilibrium, the price di¤erence has to be large enough to compensate
consumers for the extra search cost incurred by visiting the two single-product rms rst.
It is hard to rule out this alternative equilibrium in general, but we can do it numerically
in the uniform distribution case.
3.3 A symmetric market with two multiproduct rms
Now suppose both pairs of rms merge and we have two symmetric multiproduct rms
A and B. This is a multiproduct search model studied in Zhou (2014). We look for a
symmetric equilibrium where both rms charge the same price pm for each product and
consumers search in a random order (i.e. half of the consumers visit rm A rst and the
other half visit rm B rst).
We rst explain the optimal stopping rule in multiproduct search. Consider a consumer
who visits rm A rst. After nding out rm As prices and match utilities, she faces
the following three options: stop searching and buy both products immediately, or buy
one product rst and keep searching for the other, or keep searching for both products.
However, in our model the second option is always dominated by the third: if the consumer
decides to search rm B, given the search cost is always s regardless of how many products
she is still searching for, and given that she will have costless recall thereafter and so can
freely mix and match among the two rms, she should keep searching for both products.
Therefore, if the two rms charge the same prices, the consumer will stop searching and
buy both products immediately at rm A if its match utilities (u1A; u2A) satisfyZ u
u1A
(u1B   u1A)dG(u1B) +
Z u
u2A
(u2B   u2A)dG(u2B)  s ; (14)
where the left-hand side is the expected benet from sampling rm B. Otherwise, she
should buy none of the products and continue to search. The equality of (14) denes a
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reservation frontier u2A = (u1A) in the match utility space [u; u]2 as depicted in Figure
1 below: if the match utilities (u1A; u2A) at rm A are in the stopping region above this
frontier, the consumer should buy both products immediately, and otherwise she should
continue to visit rm B. It is clear that the reservation frontier () should be decreasing
and satisfy (a) = u where a is dened in (2). (It can also be shown that () must be
convex.)
u1A
u2A a
a
u2A = (u1A)
stopping region
Figure 1: The reservation frontier in multiproduct search
Though logically similar to single-product search, the analysis in multiproduct search
is technically more involved. We refer the reader to Zhou (2014) for the details of demand
analysis and how to derive the equilibrium price. The rst-order condition for pm to be
the equilibrium price is22
1
pm
=
Z u
a
[2 G(u1) G((u1))]g((u1))g(u1)du1+2
Z u
u
Z (u1)
u
g(u2)
2g(u1)du2du1 ; (15)
where (u1) = u for u1 2 [u; a]. In equilibrium rms share the market equally, so each
rms per product prot is m = 12pm.
In the uniform distribution example, the reservation frontier solves
(1  u1)2 + (1  (u1))2 = 2s ;
so it is the arc of a quarter-circle with a radius
p
2s. Then the double integral in (15) is
just 1 minus the area of the stopping region which is 1
4
(
p
2s)2 = 1
2
s, where   3:14 is
22As explained in Zhou (2014), for many common distributions (including the uniform distribution)
the rst-order condition is also su¢ cient for dening the equilibrium price.
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the mathematical constant. So the second term in (15) equals 2  s. The rst term can
be decomposed into two parts:
R 1
a
[1   (u)]du + R 1
a
(1   u)du. The rst part is the area
of the stopping region so equals 1
2
s, and the second part equals s by the denition of a.
Therefore, the equilibrium price is
pm =
1
2  (
2
  1)s : (16)
It increases from 1
2
to about 0:583 when s increases from 0 to 1
2
.
A main feature in multiproduct search is a joint-search e¤ect. When a rm reduces
one products price, more consumers who visit it rst will stop searching. Once they stop
searching, as we explained before they will buy both products. In other words, reducing
one products price increases the demand for the other product as well. This makes the
two products like complements even if they are physically independent, inducing each rm
to price more aggressively than in single-product search.23 We formally compare price
between single-product and multiproduct search in next subsection.
3.4 Price comparison
We now compare prices across the three market structures.
Proposition 1 (i) pm < p0 < pB for any s 2 (0; s).
(ii) Suppose g(u); g(u) > 0. There exist 0 < s1 < s2 < s such that (a) for s < s1,
pm < p0 < pA < pB if
g(u)2 + g(u)2 > 2
Z u
u
g(u)2du
2
; (17)
and pm < pA < p0 < pB if the opposite strict inequality holds; (b) pm < p0 < pA < pB for
s > s2.
(iii) pm < p0 < pA < pB for any s 2 (0; s) in the uniform distribution case with G(u) = u.
The rst result in Proposition 1(i) is that price competition between two multiprod-
uct rms is ercer than between two single-product rms. For instance, in the uniform
example with s = 0:1, we have pm  0:51 which is lower than p0  0:64 by about 20%.
Two factors drive this result. First, since searching a multiproduct rm is as costly as
searching a single-product rm, more consumers are willing to sample both rms in the
multiproduct rm case. This intensies price competition. Second, the joint-search e¤ect
23As discussed in Zhou (2014), this joint-search e¤ect can increase in s such that the equilibrium price
in multiproduct search can decrease in s even under the log-concavity condition.
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in the multiproduct rm case further drives price down.24 The second result in Proposi-
tion 1(i) is that pB is the highest price across all three market structures since we already
know pA < pB.
However, it is hard to compare pA with p0 and pm in general. More progress can be
made when s is small or large as shown in Proposition 1(ii). In both cases, the price in the
symmetric case with two multiproduct rms is always the lowest, but when s is small the
comparison between pA and p0 depends on the details of the match utility distribution.
One can check that (17) holds, for example, for any linear density function dened on [0; 1]
except for the uniform one,25 but it can also be easily voilated, for example, when both
g(u) and g(u) are close to 0. Proposition 1(iii) rank prices in the uniform distribution
example, and they are depicted in Figure 2 below (where from top to bottom the curves
are pB, pA, p0 and pm).
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
s
Figure 2: Price comparison across market structures (uniform distribution)
One main observation from this price comparison is that the price competition can be
the weakest in the asymmetric market. Intuitively, this is because the small rms in the
asymmetric market charge high prices due to the market segmentation logic explained
before, and by strategic complementarity this can even induce the multiproduct rm to
24This joint-search e¤ect is so strong that pm can be lower than p0 even if visiting a multiproduct
rm is twice as costly as visiting a single-product rm. Consider the uniform example, and suppose that
visiting a single-product rm only costs s2 (in which case the search cost condition (1) becomes s < 1).
It is easy to check that pm < p0 for any s 2 (0; 1). For example when s = 0:1, pm  0:51 is still lower
than p0  0:59 by about 13:5%.
25For the uniform distribution, the equality of (17) holds and so the rst-order approximations of p0
and pA are equal when s is small such that they cannot guide the comparison of p0 and pA. But result
(iii) shows that p0 < pA in the uniform case.
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set high prices as well. As we will show in next section, due to this price competition
e¤ect even the small rms in the asymmetric market can earn more than in the initial
fragmented market. In other words, the rst merger can benet all rms.
4 Equilibrium Market Structure
We are now ready to investigate the equilibrium market structure. Notice that the equi-
librium structure will be the same regardless of whether the rms make their merger
decisions simultaneously (in pure strategies) or sequentially. We start with the following
useful observations:
Lemma 2 (i) 0 < A for any s 2 (0; s), and so the fragmented market structure with
four single-product rms is never an equilibrium outcome.
(ii) Then if B  m, the equilibrium market structure is asymmetric with a multiproduct
rm and two single-product rms, while if B < m, the equilibrium market structure is
symmetric with two multiproduct rms.
Result (i) is immediately implied by pB > p0 from Proposition 1(i). Notice that in
the asymmetric market structure, rm A could always unilaterally deviate by charging
pB and get a prot pBQ(0), which is greater than 0 =
p0
2
given pB > p0 and Q(0) > 12 .
Hence by revealed preference, when rm A charges its equilibrium price, its prot strictly
exceeds 0. Result (ii) is obvious.
It is hard to fully characterize the equilibrium market structure for a general distri-
bution. Nevertheless progress can be made under mild conditions if the search cost s is
su¢ ciently small or large, and we can also fully solve for the equilibrium market structure
in the uniform distribution case.
Proposition 2 (i) Suppose g(u); g(u) > 0. There exist 0 < s3 < s4 < s such that the
equilibrium market structure is asymmetric if s < s3 and symmetric with two multiproduct
rms if s > s4.
(ii) In the uniform distribution case with G(u) = u, there exists s^ 2 (0; s) such that the
equilibrium market structure is asymmetric when s < s^ and otherwise symmetric with two
multiproduct rms.
Proposition 2 can be explained as follows. Intuitively a merger between a pair of rms
leads to two di¤erent e¤ects. Firstly, there is a search e¤ect: the merged entity o¤ers
one-stop shopping convenience and so receives a larger demand for its products. Secondly
though, there is a price competition e¤ect: the merger changes the market structure and
hence the intensity of competition. At least in the cases covered in the above proposition,
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starting from the initial situation with four single-product rms, if one pair deviates and
merges, both of these e¤ects work in their favor: they secure higher demand and price
competition is also softened in the asymmetric market structure. As a result, A > 0
and there will be no equilibrium with the fragmented market structure. However once
there is already a multiproduct rm in the market, the second pair faces a trade-o¤when
they contemplate merging. On the one hand, a merger restores symmetry and random
search, and therefore wins back some demand. However on the other hand, the merger
intensies competition because as discussed earlier price competition is ercest when there
are two multiproduct rms. As one might expect, the search e¤ect is stronger when the
search cost is higher, and so the second pair of single-product rms choose to merge only
if s is high enough. Consequently our model predicts that when the search friction is
relatively small, the industry settles on an asymmetric market structure. Intuitively the
large (generalist) and small (specialist) rms target di¤erent consumer segments as a way
to soften competition.
Surprisingly, if the search e¤ect is relatively weak, it is possible that the rst merger
benets all rms in the industry - including those not involved at all in the merger. The
following result provides a su¢ cient condition for that to happen.
Corollary 1 Suppose g(u) > 0. There exists s5 2 (0; s) such that B > 0 (i.e. the
remaining single-product rms benet from a merger) if s < s5 and (17) holds.
So far we have assumed that merger is costless. If we introduce a xed cost of merging,
we might expect the asymmetric market structure to arise more often. To illustrate this,
in the uniform distribution case we can show that A   0 > m   B i.e. because
the symmetric market with two multiproduct rms is very competitive, a second merger
is always less protable than the rst. Consequently if the cost of merging is between
m   B and A   0, the market will end up being asymmetric even if m > B.26
4.1 Consumer surplus and total welfare
Finally we compare consumer surplus and total welfare across market structures to see (i)
whether they are maximized under the equilibrium market structure, and (ii) how they
change with the search friction once we account for endogeneity of market structure.
As a preliminary step, we rst develop a method to calculate consumer surplus. This is
useful because brute-force calculation of consumer surplus in search models with product
di¤erentiation tends to be messy.
26Of course if the merger cost is su¢ ciently high, even the rst merger will not happen and the market
will end up being fragmented.
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Lemma 3 Under any of the three market structures, the expected consumer surplus in
equilibrium equals
V  
Z s
0
T (x)dx ;
where V is consumer surplus when consumers can freely search and compare all options
given the equilibrium prices associated with the actual search cost s, and T (x) is the
expected number of searches a consumer conducts when the search cost is x given the
equilibrium prices associated with the actual search cost s.
Our method of calculating consumer surplus is economically intuitive. It decomposes
consumer surplus into two separate parts: one which is only related to match utilities and
prices, and the other which is only related to the search cost. Moreover as can be seen
from the proof, our method applies for a general case with more rms, and so is interesting
in its own right. Total welfare is then the sum of consumer surplus and industry prot.
We use the case of a fragmented market to illustrate how the above method works.
Since search is totally separable between the two products, let us consider the search
market for product i. Then V = E[maxfuiA; uiBg] p0 since the consumer will choose the
best product i when search is free, and T (x) = 1+G(a(x)), where a(x) is the reservation
match utility dened in (2) when the search cost is x, since the consumer will search the
second rm if and only if the rst rms match utility is below a(x). Therefore per-product
consumer surplus in the fragmented market is
CS0 = E[maxfuiA; uiBg]  p0  
Z s
0
[1 +G(a(x))]dx ;
and per-product total welfare is TW0 = CS0 + p0. (Since the basic valuation v for
each product does not a¤ect the comparison across market structures, we do not include
it in the calculation.) In the uniform distribution example, E[maxfuiA; uiBg] = 23 and
a(x) = 1 p2x, so one can check that
CS0 =
2
3
  p0   2s
 
1 
p
2s
3
!
: (18)
Denote by CSA and TWA the per-product consumer surplus and total welfare in the
asymmetric market, and by CSm and TWm the per-product consumer surplus and total
welfare in the symmetric market with two multiproduct rms. We then have the following
welfare comparison results:
Proposition 3 (i) CSm > CSA; CS0 if the symmetric market with two multiproduct
rms has the lowest market prices, and TWm > TWA; TW0.
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(ii) In the uniform distribution case with G(u) = u, there exists an ~s 2 (0; s) such that
CSm > CS0 > CSA (i.e. the asymmetric market structure is worst for consumers) when
s < ~s, and otherwise CSm > CSA  CS0 (i.e. the fragmented market structure is worst
for consumers), while TWm > TWA > TW0 for any s 2 (0; s).
It is not surprising that the symmetric market with two multiproduct rms has the
highest total welfare. Since the market is fully covered, payments from consumers to rms
are just transfers which do not directly a¤ect welfare. Instead, welfare is determined
by the e¢ ciency of the match between consumers and products, and also how much
consumers end up searching. The symmetric market with two multiproduct rms is
therefore better because one-stop shopping convenience induces consumers to spend less
on search. Moreover compared to the asymmetric market, it is also better because prices
are the same across rms and so consumers make socially e¢ cient search and purchase
decisions. If the symmetric market also leads to the lowest industry prot, then it must be
the best for consumers. The total welfare comparison between the fragmented market and
the asymmetric market is trickier: the former has the advantage of no price dispersion,
but the latter has search cost savings from visiting the multiproduct rm. It turns out
that at least in the uniform distribution case the search cost e¤ect dominates, and so the
asymmetric market is more e¢ cient. For consumer surplus, the asymmetric market has
an additional disadvantage since it is most expensive. Consequently, when the search cost
e¤ect is relatively weak, the asymmetric market becomes the worst for consumers among
all possible market structures.
Two observations immediately follow from Propositions 2 and 3. Firstly, the equilib-
riummarket structure is not necessarily optimal for consumers and total e¢ ciency because
the asymmetric market can arise in equilibrium. Secondly, due to the endogeneity of the
market structure, reducing the search cost can harm both consumers surplus and social
e¢ ciency. This happens when the market structure switches from the symmetric one with
two multiproduct rms to the asymmetric one.
5 Robustness Discussion
Asymmetric equilibrium in symmetric markets. In the pricing analysis of the two sym-
metric market structures, we have focused on a symmetric equilibrium where rms charge
the same price in each product market and consumers search in a random order. This
is the tradition in the search literature when rms are ex ante symmetric. However, as
suggested by the analysis of the asymmetric market structure in Section 3.2, there also
exist asymmetric equilibria in a symmetric market: if all consumers expect a particular
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rm to be cheaper, they visit it rst such that it optimally charges less.27 In the follow-
ing, we discuss this issue and argue that our prediction concerning equilibrium market
structure remains qualitatively unchanged even if we consider asymmetric equilibrium in
symmetric markets.
In the fragmented market with four single-product rms, the asymmetric equilibrium
in each product market is the same as that characterized in the asymmetric market.
Recall that the prominent multiproduct rm A earns more on each product than its
single-product rivals i.e. A > B. We therefore have that A+ B < 2A, which implies
that starting with a fragmented market, a prominent rm in product market i and a
non-prominent rm in product market j 6= i have an incentive to merge. Consequently
the fragmented market structure cannot arise in equilibrium.
Suppose now that a multiproduct rm already exists, and consider whether the re-
maining pair of single-product rms want to merge. Assuming that following the merger
the two multiproduct rms will play an asymmetric equilibrium, we need to distinguish
between whether the second pair of rms that merge become prominent or (stay) non-
prominent. Firstly, suppose the second pair that merge are non-prominent. Intuitively
they are likely to be worse o¤ compared to the symmetric equilibrium which we studied
earlier: price competition between two multiproduct rms is still erce due to the joint
search e¤ect, but now the second merger does not restore random search. This suggests
that an asymmetric market structure is more likely to arise compared to our earlier analy-
sis with symmetric equilibrium. Secondly though, it is possible that when the second pair
of rms merge they become prominent. (However this seems less plausible, because it
requires that the merger causes consumers to completely reverse their search order.) In
this case, one would expect the asymmetric market structure to arise less often.
The asymmetric equilibrium with two multiproduct rms has not been explored in
the literature.28 The analysis is more complicated than the equilibrium analysis of an
asymmetric market that we did before. The details are reported in a separate online
appendix. There we derive the rst-order conditions for the equilibrium prices and also
show a similar result to Proposition 2(i). In particular when g(u); g(u) > 0, the equi-
librium market structure is asymmetric when the search cost is su¢ ciently small, and
it is symmetric with two multiproduct rms when the search cost is su¢ ciently high,
regardless of whether the second pair of single-product rms will become prominent or
non-prominent after their merger. In the uniform distribution example, there is no simple
analytical solution for the asymmetric equilibrium prices. However, numerical simulations
suggest a cut-o¤ result like Proposition 2(ii). Specically, if the rms involved in a sec-
27Notice however that this asymmetric equilibrium requires strong coordination among consumers.
28Zhou (2014) focuses on the symmetric equilibrium.
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ond merger remain non-prominent, the market structure is asymmetric for s smaller than
about 0:17, and otherwise has two multiproduct rms. If instead the rms involved in
a second merger become prominent afterwards, equilibrium market structure is the same
except that the threshold falls to around 0:045. This conrms our intuitive discussion
above, because in our earlier analysis where rms played symmetric equilibrium following
the second merger, the threshold was about 0:092.
Homogeneous products. Our main model has assumed that each product has two
di¤erentiated versions, and so consumers search for both higher product suitability and
lower prices. However in some retail markets rms supply very similar or even identical
versions of a product, and so consumers care mainly about prices. In an earlier version
of this paper, we also study an alternative model with homogeneous products and price
dispersion. There we consider the same two-stage game as in the main model, but adopt a
di¤erent approach to model shopping frictions (in the spirit of Varian (1980)): a fraction
 2 (0; 1) of consumers are shoppers, who can search and multi-stop shop freely, while
the remaining fraction 1  of consumers are non-shoppers, who can visit only one rm
(e.g. due to time constraints) and so value the one-stop shopping convenience from having
multiproduct rms the market. We show a similar result concerning equilibrium market
structure: asymmetric market arises when 1    (which measures the search friction) is
relatively small.
6 Conclusion
This paper o¤ers a tractable framework to study equilibrium retail market structure
when consumers buy multiple products and value one-stop shopping convenience. We
have shown that the size of the search friction plays an important role in determining the
equilibrium market structure. When search frictions are relatively high the market has all
large rms. However when search frictions are relatively low, the market is asymmetric
with a mix of large and small rms, since this allows rms to target di¤erent consumer
niches and thereby soften competition. As such, our model provides a simple explanation
for the puzzling observation that large and small retailers usually coexist. It is also consis-
tent with anecdotal evidence that online markets - where search costs should typically be
lower - are even less symmetric than o­ ine ones.29 Of course we do not wish to claim that
ours is the only explanation for why some retailers may choose to remain small. Other
considerations such as nancial constraints are also likely to be important. Nevertheless
our paper provides a novel strategic explanation which is complementary to those already
in the literature.
29For example in 2012 Amazon sold more than its top 12 online competitors combined.
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Throughout the paper we have chosen to focus on a merger framework. This matches
the observation (as detailed earlier in the introduction) that retailers are increasingly
growing their assortments through mergers and acquisitions. Nevertheless in an earlier
version of the paper, we showed that our insights are robust when rms can choose their
product range directly. In particular we considered a homogenous-product model with two
products, three rms and a mixture of shoppers and non-shoppers. Firms simultaneously
chose which product(s) to stock, with the rst one being free but the second incurring a
stocking cost. We showed that when a rm contemplated stocking a second product, it
faced the same trade-o¤ between search and price competition e¤ects as in our merger
framework. We further showed that the number of multiproduct rms was increasing in
the search friction, and that for low search costs and an intermediate stocking cost an
asymmetric market emerged with one multiproduct rm and two single-products rms
selling a di¤erent product. Hence the main insights from our merger framework carried
over, albeit in a less parsimonious way.
Our paper has several managerial implications. Firstly, when a market already has
some large retailers, other rms may nd it optimal to remain small so as to soften compe-
tition. This is especially true in markets where it is relatively easy for consumers to learn
product and price information, for example in markets with high internet penetration.
Secondly, large and small retailers should target di¤erent types of consumer, and tailor
their pricing strategies accordingly. Finally, our model also suggests that the negative
e¤ect of lower search costs on industry prots can be mitigated, and even overturned,
provided that managers are exible and able to quickly adjust their product o¤erings.
Appendix: Omitted Proofs and Details
Proof of Lemma 1. (11) and (12) imply
 =
1 Q()
Q0()  g(a )[1 G(a)]  
Q()
Q0()
 () : (19)
Since Q(0) = 1
2
+ 1
2
[1 G(a)]2, we have 1 Q(0) = Q(0)  [1 G(a)]2. Then
(0) > 0, Q(0)  [1 G(a)]
2
Q0(0)  g(a)[1 G(a)] >
Q(0)
Q0(0)
, Q(0)
Q0(0)
>
1 G(a)
g(a)
:
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This is true because
Q0(0) = g(a)[1 G(a)] +
Z a
u
g(u)dG(u)
= g(a)[1 G(a)] +
Z a
u
g(u)
1 G(u) [1 G(u)]dG(u)
< g(a)[1 G(a)] + g(a)
1 G(a) [G(a) 
1
2
G(a)2]
=
g(a)
1 G(a)Q(0) ;
where the inequality uses the strict log-concavity of 1   G (or equivalently that g
1 G is
increasing), which is implied by our assumption that g is stictly log-concave.
On the other hand, using LHôpitals rule we have that
(a  u) = 1 G(a)
g(a)
  1
g(u)[1 G(a)] <
1
g(u)
[1  1
1 G(a) ] < 0 < a  u ;
where the rst inequality again uses the strict log-concavity of 1   G. Therefore by
continuity () =  has a solution between 0 and a  u.
When s! s, we have a! u and so ! 0. When s! 0, we have a! u and so (19)
becomes
 =
1  2Q()
Q0()
:
It does not hold for any  > 0 since Q() > 1
2
for  > 0, but it holds for  = 0 given
Q(0) = 1
2
at a = u.
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) We rst show pm < p0 when 1 G is strictly log-concave
(which is implied by the strict log-concavity of g). From (15), we have
1
pm
>
Z u
a
[1 G((u1))]g((u1))g(u1)du1 + 2
Z u
u
Z (u1)
u
g(u2)
2g(u1)du2du1
=
Z u
u
(
[1 G((u1))]g((u1)) + 2
Z (u1)
u
g(u2)
2du2
)
dG(u1) :
(The inequality is from discarding
R u
a
[1 G (u1)] g ( (u1)) g (u1) du1 in (16). The equality
used the fact that (u1) = u and so 1 G((u1)) = 0 for u1  a.) When 1 G is strictly log-
concave, the curly-bracket term is a strictly increasing function of (u1). Since (u1)  a,
we have
1
pm
>
Z u
u

[1 G(a)]g(a) + 2
Z a
u
g(u2)
2du2

dG(u1) = [1 G(a)]g(a)+2
Z a
u
g(u)2du =
1
p0
:
We then prove p0 < pB. We need the following result which will be proved later:
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Claim 1 When g is log-concave, g (a ) [1 G (a)] + 2 R a 
u
g (u+) dG (u) is a de-
creasing function of .
The claim implies that
g (a ) [1 G (a)]+2
Z a 
u
g (u+) dG (u)  g (a) [1 G (a)]+2
Z a
u
g (u) dG (u) =
1
p0
:
Using the fact that Q0() = g (a ) [1 G (a)] + R a 
u
g (u+) dG (u), we then have
Q()
pA
+
1 Q()
pB
 1
p0
:
Since we already know pA < pB, we can then conclude pB > p0.
Proof of Claim 1. The derivative of the objective function with respect to  is
 g0 (a ) [1 G (a)]  2g (a) g (a ) + 2
Z a 
u
g0 (u+) dG (u) : (20)
We aim to show this is negative. First, notice that the log-concavity of 1 G implies
[1 G(a)]g
0(a)
g(a)
+ g(a)  0 :
Meanwhile, we have
g0(a)
g(a)
 g
0(a )
g(a )
from the log-concavity of g. Therefore,
[1 G(a)]g
0(a )
g(a ) + g(a)  0)  g
0 (a ) [1 G (a)]  g (a) g (a )  0 : (21)
Second, we haveZ a 
u
g0 (u+) g (u) du =
Z a 
u
g0 (u+)
g(u+)
g(u)g(u+)du

Z a 
u
g0 (u)
g(u)
g(u)g(u+)du
=
Z a 
u
g0 (u) g(u+)du
= g(a )g(a)  g(u)g(u+) 
Z a 
u
g (u) g0(u+)du :
(The inequality used the log-concavity of g, and the last step is from integration by parts.)
Then
2
Z a 
u
g0 (u+) g (u) du  g(a )g(a)  g(u)g(u+) ;
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and so
 g (a) g (a ) + 2
Z a 
u
g0 (u+) dG (u)   g(u)g(u+)  0 : (22)
It is then clear that (21) and (22) imply that (20) is negative.
(ii-a) We aim to show the result when s is close to 0, or equivalently when a is close to u
since a is strictly decreasing in s. Suppose a = u  , where  > 0 but very small. We rst
approximate equilibrium prices in various market structures using a Taylor expansion.
We use the notation
p  1
2
R u
u
g(u)2du
; (23)
which is actually the equilibrium price under any market structure when information is
perfect i.e. when s = 0.
Under the fragmented market structure, suppose the (rst-order) linear approximation
of the equilibrium price is p0  p+ k0, where k0 is to be determined. Notice that
g(a)[1 G(a)] = g(u  )[1 G(u  )]  g(u)2 ;
and Z a
u
g(u)2du =
Z u 
u
g(u)2du  1
2p
  g(u)2 ;
where p is dened in (23). Then (6) requires
1  (p+ k0)

1
p
  g(u)2

;
which after discarding all higher-order terms allows us to solve
k0 = p
2g(u)2 : (24)
Under the symmetric market structure with two multiproduct rms, suppose the (rst-
order) linear approximation of the equilibrium price is pm  p + km, where km is to be
determined. The rst term in (15) equalsZ u
u 
[2 G(u) G((u))]g((u))g(u)du
 [2 G(u  ) G((u  ))]g((u  ))g(u  )
= [1 G(u  )]g(u)g(u  ) :
(The equality uses (u   ) = (a) = u.) This clearly has no rst-order e¤ects. Half of
the second term in (15) equalsZ a
u
Z u
u
g(u2)
2g(u1)du2du1 +
Z u
a
Z (u1)
u
g(u2)
2g(u1)du2du1
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It is easy to verify thatZ u 
u
Z u
u
g(u2)
2g(u1)du2du1  1
2p
(1  g(u))
and Z u
u 
Z (u1)
u
g(u2)
2g(u1)du2du1  1
2p
g(u) ;
where again we use (u  ) = (a) = u. Since the  terms just cancel each other out, the
second term in (15) has no rst-order e¤ects either. We can thus conclude that km = 0.
That is, in multiproduct search when a decreases slightly from u, it has no rst-order
impact on the equilibrium price.
Under the asymmetric market structure, suppose the (rst-order) linear approximation
of the equilibrium prices is pA  p + kA and pB  p + kB, where kA and kB are to be
determined. Then   , where  = kB   kA. One can verify thatZ a 
u
[1 G(u+)]dG(u) 
Z u (1+)
u
[1 G(u+ )]dG(u)  1
2
  
2p
 :
Hence
Q()  1
2
+

2p
 : (25)
One can also verify that g(a )[1 G(a)]  g(u)2, andZ a 
u
g(u+)dG(u) 
Z u (1+)
u
g(u+)dG(u) 
Z u
u
g(u)2du 

(1 +

2
)g(u)2 +

2
g(u)2

 ;
where we use
R u
u
g0(u)g(u)du = 1
2
(g(u)2   g(u)2). Hence
Q0() = g(a )[1 G(a)] +
Z a 
u
g(u+)dG(u)  1
2p
  
2
 
g(u)2 + g(u)2

 :
Therefore (11) requires
(p+ kA)

1
2p
  
2
 
g(u)2 + g(u)2



 1
2
+

2p
 ;
from which we can solve
kA = [1 + p
2(g(u)2 + g(u)2)] : (26)
Similarly (12) requires
(p+ kB)

1
2p
 

(1 +

2
)g(u)2 +

2
g(u)2



=
1
2
  
2p
 ;
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from which we can solve
kB = 2p
2g(u)2 + [p2(g(u)2 + g(u)2)  1] : (27)
From (26), (27) and  = kB   kA, it is easy to derive
 =
2
3
p2g(u)2 ; (28)
and it then follows that
kA =
2
3
p2g(u)2[1 + p2(g(u)2 + g(u)2)] ; (29)
and
kB =
2
3
p2g(u)2

2 + p2(g(u)2 + g(u)2)

: (30)
Notice that k0, kA and kB are strictly positive given g(u) > 0. Then we can compare
prices in a meaningful way when s is close to 0. pm is the smallest since km = 0, and one
can also easily verify that pB is the biggest since kB > kA; k0. It remains to compare p0
and pA. p0 < pA if and only if k0 < kA. Using (24) and (29), one can check that k0 < kA
if and only if 1
2
< p2(g(u)2+ g(u)2), which is equivalent to condition (17) by using (23).30
(ii-b) We then show the result when s is close to s, or equivalently when a is close to u.
The rst observation is that as s ! s we have  ! 0 and p0; pA; pB ! 1g(u) . Meanwhile
we also know from the proof of pm < p0 that
1
pm
>
1
p0
+
Z u
a
[1 G (u)] g ( (u)) g (u) du :
Since the nal integral term is bounded away from 0 as a ! u, we conclude that in the
limit pm < p0; pA; pB.
For the rest of the proof, we need to approximate p0, pA, and pB when s is close to s.
The procedure is similar to the proof of (ii-a). Suppose a = u + , where  > 0 but very
small. We rst approximate p0  1g(u) + k^0, where k^0 is to be determined. Notice that
g (a) [1 G (a)] + 2
Z a
u
g (u)2 du  g (u) + [g0 (u) + g (u)2]
by discarding all higher order terms. Then one can check that
k^0 =  g
0 (u) + g (u)2
g (u)2
:
30Notice that if k0 = kA (which is true in the uniform distribution example), the (rst-order) approxi-
mation does not help the comparison of p0 and pA.
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Given 1   G is strictly log-concave, we have g0 [1 G] + g2 > 0. This, together with
1 G (u) = 1, implies k^0 < 0.
Then let us approximate pA  1g(u) + k^A and pB  1g(u) + k^B, where kA and kB are
to be determined. Then   ^, where ^ = k^B   k^A. One can check that
Q ()  1  (1  ^)g (u)  ;
and
Q0 ()  g (u) +
h
(1  ^)g0 (u)  ^g (u)2
i
 :
Then from pAQ0 () = Q (), we can derive
k^A = 2^   1  (1  ^) g
0 (u)
g (u)2
:
Similarly, using the rst-order condition for pB we can derive k^B = 0. Then from ^ =
k^B   k^A, we solve
k^A =   g
0 (u) + g (u)2
g0 (u) + 3g (u)2
Finally, given g0 (u) + g (u)2 > 0 under log-concavity, we have k^A 2 (k^0; 0). Together
with k^B = 0, this implies that p0 < pA < pB when s is close to s.
(iii) The uniform distribution is strictly log-concave, so we already have pm < p0 and
pA < pB. It remains to prove p0 < pA. Using (7) and (13), one can check that p0 < pA if
and only if a (1  a)2 (3 + 2a) > 0, which must be true given a 2 (0; 1).
Proof of Proposition 2. Recall that we have shown in Lemma 2(i) that A > 0
and so at least one multiproduct rm will emerge in the market. Hence, to determine
the equilibrium market structure we only need to examine whether the second pair of
single-product rms want to merge or not (i.e., to compare B with m).
(i) We rst deal with the relatively simple case where s is high. (In this case we do
not need the price approximations derived before.) Suppose s ! s (or a ! u). Under
the asymmetric market structure,  ! 0 and Q() ! 1, so (11) and (12) imply that
pA; pB ! 1g(u) . (LHôpitals rule is needed when taking the limit in (12). Intuitively in
either case each rm acts as a monopolist.) Then B = pB(1 Q())! 0 < m = 12pm.
Therefore two multiproduct rms emerge in equilibrium when s is su¢ ciently close to s.
We then turn to the case where s is small. In this case we need the price approximations
when s is close to 0 in the proof of Proposition 1. Using (25), (28) and (30), we have
B = pB(1 Q())  (p+ kB)

1
2
  
2p


 p
2
+
1
3
p2g(u)2[1 + p2(g(u)2 + g(u)2)] :
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Then it is clear that B > m given m  p2 and g(u) > 0. Therefore, we conclude that
the asymmetric market arises in equilibrium when s is su¢ ciently small.
(ii) We now consider the uniform distribution case. Recall that B = pB[1   Q()].
In the uniform distribution case,
1 Q() =
Z a 
0
(1  u )du = 1
2
((1 )2   (1  a)2) ;
and  = pB   pA = 18(7  a K), where K =
p
17a2   30a+ 49. Hence
B(a) =
1
16
(K 7a+9)1
2

(1 )2   (1  a)2 = 1
32
(K 7a+9)[ 1
64
(1+a+K)2 (1 a)2] :
It is easy to check that B(0) = 0 and B(1) = 14 . Lengthy calculations also show that
B(a) is concave in a, and that 0B(1) =  18 .
On the other hand,
m(a) =
1
2
pm =
1
2[2  (1
2
   1) (1 a)2
2
]
:
It is easy to see that m(a) is decreasing and convex in a, and that m(1) = 14 . One can
also check that 0m(1) = 0.
Given the above properties of B(a) and m(a), we can conclude that there exists
a^ 2 (0; 1) such that B(a) > m(a) if and only if a > a^. Since a is decreasing in s, this
implies the desired result.31
Proof of Corollary 1. Suppose s is close to zero so that a = u   . Using the
approximation results in the proof of Proposition 1, we have
0 =
p0
2
 p
2
+
1
2
p2g(u)2
and
B  p
2
+
1
3
p2g(u)2[1 + p2(g(u)2 + g(u)2)] :
Given g(u) > 0, B > 0 if and only if p2(g(u)2 + g(u)2) > 12 . Using the expression for p
in (23), this simplies to (17).
Proof of Lemma 3. In the equilibrium of all of our search models, each consumer
maximizes her expected surplus, given the equilibrium prices, by choosing an optimal
search rule (which species how to search and which option to select eventually). Let
 be the set of all possible search rules. If a consumer adopts search rule  2 , her
expected surplus can be written as U()   sT (), where U() is the expected utility
31Numerical calculation shows that the threshold is s^  0:092.
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from the purchased option under  and T () is the expected number of searches. (Note
that any monetary payment has been included in U , and neither U nor T involves the
search cost s directly.) Let V (s)  max2 U()   sT (), and T (s)  T ((s)) where
(s)  argmax2 U()   sT () is the optimal search rule given s. (As standard in
the search literature, both  and the optimization problem are well behaved provided
that probabilistic search rules are allowed.) Notice that V (s) must be convex in s since
the objective function in the maximization problem is linear in s. As a result, V (s) is
di¤erentiable almost everywhere, and V 0(s) =  T (s) by an envelope argument. Then
V (s) = V (0) +
Z s
0
V 0(x)dx = V (0) 
Z s
0
T (x)dx:
Here V (0) is the consumers expected surplus, given the equilibrium prices, if the search
cost were zero (in which case the consumer would freely compare all options), and T (x) is
the expected number of searches, given the equilibrium prices, if the search cost were x.
Notice that this argument works regardless of whether we are considering random or non-
random search (as long as consumers choose the optimal search rule), and single-product
or multiproduct search.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) We rst compare total welfare in the general case.
Notice that with full market coverage, consumer payment is a pure transfer between
consumers and rms, so total welfare only measures the match e¢ ciency between con-
sumers and products (i.e., the match quality minus the search cost). In the case with two
multiproduct rms, after visiting the rst rm, say, A, a consumer can search as in the
fragmented market: if u1A < a, she continues to visit rm B and then buys the better
product 1; after this is done for product 1, if u1B < a, she visits rm B again by paying
the search cost again and then buys the better product 2. This search process is clearly
suboptimal. But even so, the consumer still does better than in the fragmented market
in terms of the match e¢ ciency because the rst search only costs s
2
for each product.
This proves TWm > TW0. After visiting rm A, the consumer can also adopt a similar
suboptimal search rule by replacing the above a by a  . That will generate the same
match e¢ ciency as in the asymmetric case. This proves TWm > TWA.32
When pm < p0; pA; pB, the symmetric market with two multiproduct rms has the
lowest industry prot, so the consumer surplus result follows immediately. (Recall that
pm < p0 < pB under the log-concavity condition, but we have not been able to show
pm < pA.)
32We do not have a general comparison between TWA and TW0, because the former saves on search
costs for the rst pair of products, but has a less e¢ cient search for the second pair of products due to
the price dispersion across rms.
32
(ii) In the uniform distribution case, since pm is the lowest price among all three
possible market structures, the results in (i) apply. Then it remains to compare the
asymmetric market with the fragmented market. Using (18) and a = 1 p2s, we rewrite
the consumer surplus and total welfare in the fragmented market as:
CS0 = a  1
3
a3   1
1 + a
and TW0 = a  1
3
a3 :
In the asymmetric market, per-product consumer surplus is
CSA = E[maxfuiA   pA; uiB   pBg]  1
2
Z s
0
[1 + 2G(a(x) )] dx ;
where the rst expectation term is V=2 in Lemma 3, and 1+2G(a(x) ) is the expected
number of searches when the search cost is x. (The latter is because a consumer will
visit the multiproduct rm for sure, and after that visit each single-product rm with
probability G(a(x) ).) Per-product total welfare in this case is TWA = CSA+A+B.
In the uniform distribution case, one can check
CSA =
1
2
+
(1 )3
6
  pA   s(3
2
   2
p
2s
3
) :
This can be rewritten as
CSA =
1
16
"
(1 + a+K)3
192
  (3K   5a  13)  (1  a)
2 (19a+ 3K   1)
3
#
;
where K =
p
17a2   30a+ 49. Using the prot expressions, one can also check that
TWA =
1
1536

139 + 789a+ 393a2   513a3 + 3(7  a)(1 + a)K + 3(3  a)K2  K3 :
DeneCS(a) = CS0 CSA. Simple calculations show thatCS(0) =  14 ,CS(1) =
0 and CS 0(1) =   1
12
. Lengthier calculations show that CS(a) is concave in a 2 [0; 1].
Hence there exists a critical ~a such that CS(a) < 0 if and only if a < ~a. Given a
decreases in s, this proves the consumer surplus result.
Dene TW (a) = TW0   TWA. Simple calculations show that TW (0) =  14 ,
TW (1) = 0 and TW 0 (1) = 0. Lengthier calculations also show that TW (a) is
strictly concave in a 2 (0; 1), and hence TW (a) < 0 for a < 1 and the total welfare
result follows.
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Details of the Asymmetric Equilibrium With Two Multiproduct Firms
[Online Appendix: Not For Publication]
In this supplementary document, we characterize the asymmetric equilibrium in the
symmetric market with two multiproduct rms A and B. Suppose all consumers visit rm
A rst in equilibrium. Let pimk be rm ks price for its product i. Let = (1;2), where
i  pimB   pimA is the price di¤erence of product i across rms. Denote by S() the
stopping region in rm As match utility space, and let NS() be the complement. The
stopping region is characterized by a reservation frontier (u1)  (u1+1) 2, where
() is the reservation frontier in the symmetric case with  = 0 and it solvesZ u
u1
[1 G(x)]dx+
Z u
(u1)
[1 G(x)]dx = s :
A consumer will stop searching and buy both products immediately at rm A if the match
utilities discovered there are such that u2 > (u1).
Since each rms two products are symmetric, we look for an equilibrium where p1mk =
p2mk = pmk and 1 = 2 =  = pmB   pmA. Suppose an equilibrium with  2 (0; u   u)
exists for any s 2 (0; s) and in equilibrium all consumers buy (i.e., the market is fully
covered).1 Let mk be rm ks equilibrium prot from each product. Then the asymmetric
market structure arises in equilibrium if the second pair of single-product rms become
the non-prominent rm after merger and mB < B, or if the second pair become the
prominent one after merger and mA < B. While if these inequalities are violated the
equilibrium market structure has two multiproduct rms. The following two graphs depict
the reservation frontier in equilibrium:
u1
u2
S()
NS()
(u1)
a 
a 
(a): a  > u
u 
u  u1
u2
S()
NS()
(u1)
(b): a  < u
(u)
(u)
Figure 3: The reservation frontier in asymmetric equilibrium
1If   u  u, no consumers will search beyond the rst rm even if search is almost costless.
1
Figure 3(a) is the case for a  > u, where (u1) has a vertical segment with (u1) 2
[u ; u] at u1 = a , and a horizontal segment with (u1) = a  for u1 2 [u ; u];
Figure 3(b) is the case for a   < u, where (u1) hits the vertical axis at u2 = (u)
and hits the horizontal axis at u1 = (u) (where we have used the fact 
 1() = ()
since the two products are symmetric). Notice that a = u at s = 0, so the rst case applies
when s is small; while a = u at s = s, so the second case applies when s is large.
We assume that the equilibrium prices pmA and pmB are determined by the rst-order
conditions (up to some possible corner solution adjustment when a    = u as we will
discuss later). We rst consider the case with a    > u (so that Figure 3(a) applies).
Suppose rm A unilaterally deviates and charges pmA " for its product 2 so that2 = +
". This shifts the reservation frontier downward by " everywhere. Let (") = (;+ ").
Then rm As deviation prot is
(2pmA   ")
Z
S(("))
dG(u) +
Z
NS(("))
[pmAG(u1 +) + (pmA   ")G(u2 ++ ")]dG(u) :
Here the rst term is the prot from consumers who buy immediately at rm A, and the
second term is the prot from consumers who choose to search on and visit rm B but
eventually come back to buy something from rm A (where G(u1 +) is the chance that
rm As product 1 is better than rm Bs product 1 and G(u2++ ") is the chance that
rm As product 2 is better than rm Bs product 2). Noticing that the price deviation
a¤ects both S((")) and NS((")), one can check that the rst-order condition implies
pmA =
R
S()
dG(u) +
R
NS()
G(u2 +)dG(u)R
NS()
g(u2 +)dG(u) +
R u
a [2 G(u1 +) G((u1 +))]g((u1))dG(u1)
:
(1)
Here the numerator is the equilibrium demand for rm As product 2.
Suppose now rm B unilaterally deviates and charges pmB   " for its product 2. Then
rm Bs deviation prot isZ
NS()
fpmB[1 G(u1 +)] + (pmB   ")[1 G(u2 +  ")]gdG(u) :
When a consumer who has discovered match utilities (u1; u2) at rm A comes to visit
rm B, she will buy rm Bs product 1 with probability 1 G(u1 +) and buy rm Bs
product 2 with probability 1   G(u2 +    "). Notice that here the price deviation does
not appear in NS(), since whether a consumer will come to visit rm B or not depends
on the expected equilibrium prices of rm B (instead of the actual deviation price). This
also implies that rm Bs pricing problem is totally separable between the two products.
The rst-order condition is then
pmB =
R
NS()
[1 G(u2 +)]dG(u)R
NS()
g(u2 +)dG(u)
: (2)
2
Here the numerator is the equilibrium demand for rm Bs product 2. (Given full market
coverage, the sum of the two numerators in (1) and (2) equals 1.)
When a  < u (so that Figure 3(b) applies), the rst-order conditions are the same
except that
R u
a  in the denominator of (1) is replaced by
R (u)
u
. An analytical investi-
gation of the system of the rst-order conditions is harder than in the case of asymmetric
market structure. However, an approximation analysis when s is close to 0 or equivalently
when a is close to u (in which case Figure 3(a) applies) can be done. As a result, we can
prove a result parallel to result (i) in Proposition 2 in the main paper.
Claim 1 Suppose g (u) ; g (u) > 0 and that two multiproduct rms play an asymmetric
equilibrium. There exist 0 < s^1 < s^2 < s such that the equilibrium market structure is
asymmetric if s < s^1 and symmetric with two multiproduct rms if s > s^2.
Proof. As in the proof of result (ii) in Proposition 1 of the main paper, we approximate
prices when a is close to u (or equivalently, s is close to 0). Hence the relevant prices to
consider are those in equations (1) and (2). Consider a = u   where  > 0 but very small.
Suppose the (rst-order) linear approximations of the equilibrium prices are pmA  p+kmA
and pmB  p + kmB, where p is the price that prevails under full information and solves
1=p = 2
R u
u
g (u)2 du. We now solve for kmA and kmB, and let  = kmB   kmA.
First consider the expression (2) for pmB. The numerator can be written more explicitly
asZ a 
u
Z u 
u
[1 G (u2 +)] dG (u2)

dG (u1)
+
Z u 
a 
 Z (u1+) 
u
[1 G (u2 +)] dG (u2)
!
dG (u1)
+
Z u
u 
Z a 
u
[1 G (u2 +)] dG (u2)

dG (u1) :
(Recall that (u1) =  (u1 +)   .) Substituting in a = u    and  = , we can
then write the numerator of (2) in terms of :Z u  
u
Z u 
u
[1 G (u2 + )] dG (u2)

dG (u1)
+
Z u 
u  
 Z (u1+) 
u
[1 G (u2 + )] dG (u2)
!
dG (u1)
+
Z u
u 
Z u  
u
[1 G (u2 + )] dG (u2)

dG (u1) :
Using the rst-order Taylor approximation around the point  = 0, the rst term in this
expression is approximated by
1
2
 

(1 + ) g (u)
2
+

2p

 ;
3
whilst the second term is approximately equal to g (u) =2 and the third term is approxi-
mately equal to g (u) =2. Hence we conclude thatZ
NS()
[1 G (u2 +)] dG (u)  1
2
  
2p
 : (3)
Following the same procedure, it is also straightforward to derive thatZ
NS()
g (u2 +) dG (u)  1
2p
   g (u)
2 + g (u)2
2
 : (4)
Consequently using equation (2) and dropping higher order terms, we obtain the following
equation which determines kmA and kmB:
kmB +    

g (u)2 + g (u)2

p2 = 0 : (5)
Second consider the expression (1) for pmA. Since the numerator is rm As demand,
which consists of all consumers who do not purchase from rm B, we can immediately use
equation (3) to infer thatZ
S()
dG (u) +
Z
NS()
G (u2 +) dG (u)  1
2
+

2p
 :
Moreover the rst term in the denominator of equation (1) has already been approximated
above in equation (4). In addition it is straightforward to see that the second term in the
denominator is not rst order. Combining this information with equation (1), and again
dropping higher order terms, we obtain another equation which determines kmA and kmB:
kmA      

g (u)2 + g (u)2

p2 = 0 : (6)
Notice that equations (5) and (6) have a unique solution given by kmA = kmB = 0 (and
so  = 0), and thus we conclude that pmA  pmB  p, that
R
NS()
[1 G (u2 +)] dG (u) 
1=2, and hence mA  mB  p=2. We have shown in the proof of result (i) in Proposition
2 in the main paper that B in the asymmetric market is greater than p=2 when a = u  .
Therefore, we can conclude that mA; mB < B when a is su¢ ciently close to u, or
equivalently when the search cost is su¢ ciently small. This implies an asymmetric market
structure for small s.
(ii) Suppose now that s is close to s. Clearly since rm A is searched rst it must earn
a strictly positive prot (i.e. mA > 0). We now argue that rm B must also earn strictly
positive prot (i.e. mB > 0). Suppose to the contrary that it does not (i.e. all consumers
buy immediately at rm A). (i) Suppose that the consumer who nds (u; u) at rm A
strictly prefers to buy immediately without searching. Then rm A could slightly increase
both prices without losing any demand, which would contradict the assumption that its
price is determined by the rst-order condition. (ii) Suppose instead that the consumer
who nds (u; u) at rm A is just indi¤erent between searching and not. Then if rm A
4
slightly increases both prices, consumers around the corner of (u; u) in the match utility
space will start searching rm B. In other words, the non-stopping region of NS will
appear around that corner. But this only has a second-order e¤ect on rm As demand,
so rm As deviation must be protable. This again yields a contradiction.
In the proof of result (i) of Proposition 2 in the main paper, we have shown that B ! 0
as s ! s. Therefore, we have mA; mB > B when s ! s. This implies that the second
pair of single-product rms will choose to merge, and so a symmetric market structure
with two multiproduct rms arises in equilibrium for large s.
We now proceed to study the uniform-distribution example. When a > , one can
check that the rst-order conditions simplify to
pmA =
Q()
1 + s  (7)
and
pmB =
1 Q()
1  1
2
s  (1 +p2s) ; (8)
where Q() = 1
2
+ 2
3
s
p
2s+ (1+ s)  1
2
2 is the demand for a product of rm A. When
a < , the rst-order conditions simplify to
pmA =
Q^()
3s  2A()  (1 )pA() (9)
and
pmB =
1  Q^()R () 
0
R (u1+) 
0
du2du1
(10)
where A() = 2s   (1   )2, () = 1  pA(), and Q^() = 1   1 
3
(s   2A())  
A()
3
p
A() is the demand for a product of rm A. (The denominator in the pmB equation
does not have a simple elementary expression.) Unfortunately, neither of the two systems
has a simple analytical solution. But numerical calculation is easy to do. In the following,
we report the details.
The exact nature of the equilibrium depends on how s compares with two thresholds s0
and s00, where s0  0:427 and s00  0:436. When s < s0 the equilibrium prices satisfy a > 
and jointly solve equations (7) and (8). On the other hand, when s > s00 the equilibrium
prices satisfy a <  and jointly solve equations (9) and (10). Interestingly we nd that
when s 2 (s0; s00), the equilibrium prices satisfy a =  and rm Bs price is pinned down
by equation (8). In other words, in this case rm As problem has a corner solution. To
understand why, notice that for s relatively small the reservation frontier is as depicted in
Figure 3(a). Therefore when rm A reduces its price for, say, product 2 the whole frontier
shifts down, and demand is relatively price elastic. However as s increases, the reservation
frontier moves south-west, and touches the axes when s = s0. At this point rm A faces a
kinked demand curve and wants to price in such a way that a = . To see why, notice that
5
if rm A increases price, the reservation frontier moves north-east and demand is relatively
sensitive as before. However if rm A slightly decreases price, the situation resembles that
depicted in Figure 3(b), where suddenly the horizontal segment on the reservation frontier
with u1 2 [u ; u] disappears and so the length of the reservation frontier is decreased by
a discrete amount; equivalently, demand is much less price sensitive. Finally though, as s
increases from s0 to s00, rm A becomes relatively more expensive because its price satises
a = . Consequently at s = s00 it becomes worthwhile for rm A to reduce price in relative
terms to attract more marginal consumers, and so the equilibrium solution again satises
the interior rst-order conditions.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
s
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
(a): Non-prominent case
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
s
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
(b) Prominent case
Figure 4: Prot comparison for second merger
Figures 4(a) and 4(b) above plot equilibrium prots in this uniform example. The
red lines depict B, the prot earned by a non-prominent rm in the asymmetric market
structure. The black lines depict (per-product) prot earned by the second pair of single-
product rms if they proceed to merge: Figure 4(a) assumes they remain non-prominent
after merger and so the black line is mB, whilst Figure 4(b) assumes that they become
prominent after merger and so the black line is mA. In either case, the post-merger prot
is less than B for a su¢ ciently small s. As reported in Section 5 in the main paper, the
asymmetric market structure arises for s below approximately 0:17 and 0:045 respectively,
and otherwise the equilibrium market structure consists of two multiproduct rms.2
2One interesting observation is that whilst mA monotonically increases in s, mB is non-monotonic.
Intuitively the latter arises because as discussed above, once s reaches s0 the prominent multiproduct rm
has less incentive to reduce price. Consequently the prominent rm becomes a weaker competitor, which
by strategic complementarity benets the non-prominent multiproduct rm as well. However once s is
su¢ ciently above s00, the prominent rm starts to become more aggressive again, and steals demand away
from the non-prominent rm causing its prot to fall again.
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